I posted this yesterday on my internal work blog. Since I wrote the article, Turkey has been given the date of 3rd October 2005 to start accession talks.
This week will see developments in the frayed relationship between the European Union and Turkey come to a head. Turkey is looking for the 'carrot' (towards progress, as opposed to 'stick', oddly) it has for so long desired, that of a start date for EU accession talks. Thursday will see a decision by the European Commission on whether or not to start accession talks. Some members of the European Parliament have already made their feelings clear on the issue.
Turkish membership is a question which has in the past decade vexed Europe's political élite. There are real issues with admitting Turkey. It poses very obvious economic problems, for a start: despite a sustained annual GDP growth rate of 6%, the country still possesses a workforce which is still largely unskilled, and whose dependence on subsistence agriculture would surely bring the CAP to its knees (though maybe that's a good thing).
It's also intensely political. Washington, predictably, has long been lobbying the capitals of Europe to admit Turkey into the 25 member bloc. Turkish membership would suit American strategic objectives. Perhaps more than any other state, Germany has always made a noise about it - the legacy of the Gastarbeiter ('guest-worker') scheme has gifted Germany with the largest Turkish immigrant community in northern Europe. The CDU opposition have even been trying to change the constitution to permit a referendum on the issue.
But some nations have concerns about the issue, none more so than France. Turkish membership offends the French in two main ways. Firstly it serves as a re-affirmation of the popular sentiment that the British/Eastern European 'vision' of an ever-widening, less uniform bloc of independent states. Turkish membership would mean a less 'manageable' EU, and one in which the Franco-German 'integration motor' would be both numerically unable to dominate, and politically isolated.
Secondly, Turkish membership would almost certainly mean (and this includes France itself) permanent or semi-permanent restrictions on the beloved 'freedom of movement of people, goods and capital', with an emphasis on the 'people' part. While the availability of Turkish labour would be helpful to stem France's 'demographic time-bomb', its aging workforce, France has worked too hard to guarantee these freedoms to let them go that easily.
Ultimately a lot of the arguments being put forward on either side are the same as those being mooted over the possibility of Ukrainian accession. But somehow Turkish membership will prevail, sooner or later. France and others may wave their vetos proudly but in the end opponents know that because EU membership is the ultimate 'carrot', its usage must be accompanied by a real commitment to reward applicant nations for their progress - progress that is, in Turkey's case, undeniable.